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Abstract 
 
This paper presents the first comparative analysis of the decline in collective bargaining in two 
European countries where that decline has been most pronounced. Using workplace-level data 
and a common model, we present decompositions of changes in collective bargaining and 
worker representation in the private sector in Germany and Britain over the period 1998-2004. 
In both countries within-effects dominate compositional changes as the source of the recent 
decline in unionism. Overall, the decline in collective bargaining is more pronounced in Britain 
than in Germany, thus continuing a trend apparent since the 1980s. Although workplace 
characteristics differ markedly across the two countries, assuming counterfactual values of these 
characteristics makes little difference to unionization levels. Expressed differently, the German 
dummy looms large. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a decline in unionism in Western Europe (see 
Blanchflower, 2007; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999; Visser, 2003, 2006). The decline has 
not been uniform but has instead been concentrated in the larger countries, particularly 
Britain, Germany, and Italy. In the present paper, we take advantage of unique 
comparable workplace data to examine developments in two of these countries, 
Germany and Britain.  
We contribute to the existing literature which has focused almost entirely on 
union density using household data, by exploring factors behind the demise of 
unionization at workplace level. In a further departure from conventional practice, we 
extend our definition of plant ‘representation’ to encompass the workplace coverage of 
works councils in Germany and joint consultative committees in Britain. We deploy a 
common model of the determinants of collective bargaining/workplace representation 
and undertake a shift-share analysis of observed changes in the outcome indicators both 
across time and vertically (i.e. at a single point in time). 
The goal is to determine the contribution of compositional factors on the one 
hand and behavioral or within-group factors on the other to the decline in unionization. 
Although similar such decompositions based on union density have been undertaken for 
individual countries, ours is the first such comparative exercise. And apart from one 
other (single-country) study it is the first to consider union recognition rates at plant 
level rather than on aggregations based on the union status of individuals. Moreover, 
unlike that study it covers a larger slice of the labor force, namely workplaces with 10 
or more employees rather than 25 or more employees. And, as we have noted, our study 
is further distinguished by reason of its comparative framework and range, proceeding 
as it does beyond union recognition to encompass not only collective bargaining 
coverage but also other forms of workplace representation.  
 
2. Background 
The decline in unionism in Britain long preceded our sample period. Writing at the 
beginning of this decade, and reflecting on the findings of a study tracking employment 
relations over the previous two decades, Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000: 234) 
commented: “The system of collective relations, based on the shared values of the 
legitimacy of representation by independent trade unions and of joint regulation, 
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crumbled … to such an extent that it no longer represents a dominant model.”  The facts 
in aggregate were these: in 1979 some 73 percent of workers were union members and 
by 1999 this had fallen to 28 percent; in 1980 about 70 percent of establishments 
recognized unions for collective bargaining purposes, declining to less than 45 percent 
by the mid-1990s (Machin, 2000). These results were driven by developments in the 
private sector, and above all in manufacturing.  
Commentators were now to refer to unions as “hollow shells” (Hyman, 1997; 
Brown et al., 1998; Millward, Bryson, and Forth, 2000). Their resulting parlous state 
severely impacted the ability of British unions to service current members’ interests, let 
alone organize parts of the non-union sector (Willman and Bryson, 2009).  The 
tendency was therefore for new workplaces and new entrants to the labor force to be 
‘born’ non-union (Machin, 2000; Willman, Bryson, and Gomez, 2007), resulting in a 
rise in the proportion of all employees in the labor force who had never been union 
members. Intriguingly, the ‘never-membership’ phenomenon was even apparent in 
organized workplaces (Bryson and Gomez, 2005). Finally, British unions had focused 
their organizing activity at workplace or organizational level such that by the start of our 
sample period sectoral bargaining was already a spent force outside of the public sector 
(Brown, Bryson, and Forth, 2009: 34).   
Historically, sectoral bargaining (strictly, regional industry-wide bargaining) has 
been the key form of collective bargaining in Germany, covering some 90 percent of all 
employees.  As Schnabel, Zagelmayer, and Kohaut (2006: 168) note, things first began 
to change in the early 1970s with the emergence of what they term “qualitative 
bargaining policy,” namely sectoral agreements that sought to accommodate 
improvements in working life and the protection of employees against dislocations 
caused by rationalization and technical change. Such provisions were to be implemented 
at local level. Thence, in the 1990s, under the pressures of globalization, high 
unemployment, and unification, all aspects of the system of collective bargaining are 
widely characterized in the German literature as having being subject to more or less 
serious quantitative change. The manifestations of this erosion included a rising trend of 
firm resignations from employers’ associations (Silvia and Schroeder, 2007), a rapid 
decline in union density (Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007), and shrinking 
collective bargaining coverage (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003).  Moreover, the coverage 
of that other pillar of the German dual system – the works council (see below) – was 
also subject to some erosion (Hassel, 1999). In response to these challenges, German 
 3 
 
collective bargaining was decentralizing. One aspect of this development was the 
growth in company agreements as many firms dropped out of the centralized system. 
Another was the growth of decentralization in sectoral agreements – first through the 
device of ‘opening clauses’ that allowed firms more flexibility via locally negotiated 
adjustments to centrally agreed working time and wages, and latterly through other 
contractual innovations including ‘pacts for employment and competitiveness’ (Addison 
et al., 2009). Such organized decentralization may have slowed the flight from sectoral 
collective bargaining to firm-level bargaining and individual bargaining. Be that as it 
may, the stylized facts were these: from 1990 to 1997 the number of company 
agreements rose from 2,100 to 3,300 in western Germany (and from 2,700 to 5,000 in 
the whole of Germany) while the percentage of employees in western Germany who 
were covered by collective (sectoral) agreements fell from 83.1 (72.2) percent in 1995 
to 75 (67.8) percent in 1998 (Hassel, 1999). 
The decline in union density has been fairly extensively charted in Britain, 
somewhat less so in Germany given the longer-standing decline in the former nation. 
One early hallmark of the British analysis was the attempt to decompose the decline in 
unionization into its constituent parts. For the decade of the 1980s (strictly 1983-1989) 
Green (1992) concludes that the combined effect of compositional factors to the 
observed decline in private-sector union density from 49.6 to 38.6 percent was 30 
percent, which is taken by the author to be an upper-bound estimate since compositional 
changes are not independent of public policy or macroeconomic conditions.  
Investigating the 16 percentage point fall in private-sector union density over the 
period 1983-2001, Bryson and Gomez (2005) find that just one percentage point is 
explained by an increase in the number of workers who ceased being union members.1 
The remainder is due to the rise in the percentage of employees who never join a trade 
union (“never-members”). Overall, the authors conclude that 60 percent of the 20 
percentage point increase in never-membership over the period was due to 
compositional factors.  
Just one British study considers union recognition rates at plant level rather than 
union density based on the union status of individuals. In a wide-ranging paper focusing 
on the effects of union decline on various aspects of workplace performance, 
Blanchflower and Bryson (2009) set the scene for their analysis by examining the 
impact of workplace characteristics on union recognition using all five surveys in the 
WIRS/WERS series, 1980-2004.  The share of establishments recognizing one or more 
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unions for collective bargaining (viz. the union recognition rate) fell from 49.5 percent 
in 1980 to 22.3 percent in 2004 among all private-sector workplaces with 25 or more 
employee. Applying the predictions of the 1980 model to the 2004 sample, 
Blanchflower and Bryson conclude that behavioral factors (largely employer choices) 
dominated any effects arising from changes in the structure of the workplace since no 
less than 68 percent (18.5 percentage points) of the decline in union recognition was the 
result of within-group changes. 
The early literature on the determinants of union density in Germany indicated 
that the propensity for union membership had not changed materially over time (see, 
inter al., the literature review in Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang, 2006). However, two 
more recent contributions challenge the implication that the decline in union density in 
that country has mainly been driven by composition effects. Using data from three cross 
sections of the ALLBUS general survey from 1980 to 2004 in western Germany and 
from 1992 to 2004 in eastern Germany, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) estimate the 
determinants of an individual’s union membership status. In decomposing the 
differences in union membership over time and between the two halves of Germany, 
their analysis uses estimates directly from their probit estimation model (see Jann, 
2006). Focusing here on differences over time, their findings for western Germany – 
comparing 1980 and 2004 for example and using the results for 1980 as the reference 
group – indicate that changes in the composition of the sample of employees explain 
just 0.16 percentage points (or 1.4 percent) of the 11.49 percentage point decline in the 
share of employees that were union members over the sample period (although the 
compositional effects are larger when taking the results for 2004 as the reference 
group). For their part, the east German results pointed to even smaller compositional 
effects.  
A study by Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang (2006) using data from six (four) 
waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel for western (eastern) Germany estimates 
individual membership functions via a correlated random effects probit model. As far as 
the authors’ decompositions are concerned, the coefficients’ effect dominates 
throughout.  The characteristics’ effects explain under one-third of the 6 percentage 
point decline in union density in western Germany between 1993 and 2003, and under 
one-fifth of the 19 percentage point decline in eastern Germany over the same interval. 
The role of characteristics versus coefficients is also evaluated in terms of east-west 
comparisons at the start and end of the period. In 1993 when union density in the east 
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exceeded that in the west by 11 percentage points, the composition of the west German 
labor force actually favored higher density (by 5 percentage points). Accordingly, the 
higher density in the east resulted from a 16 percentage point difference in coefficients; 
that is, for given characteristics, east Germans were at this time more strongly unionized 
than their western counterparts. But by 2003 union density in the east had fallen some 2 
percentage points below that of the west. Since the composition of the labor force in the 
west still favored higher density, it follows that the coefficients effect had become more 
similar in the two halves of the country. On balance, therefore, the emerging consensus 
of the recent German literature is that changes in the composition of the workforce have 
played a minor role in the decline in union density.  
We analyze the decline in private-sector collective bargaining in Britain and 
Germany. Our unit of analysis throughout is the establishment rather than aggregations 
based on individual employees that have preoccupied both literatures (with the notable 
exception of Blanchflower and Bryson, 2009).  Drawing on the German Institute for 
Employment Research Establishment (IAB) Panel and the British Workplace 
Employment Relations Surveys (WERS), we offer the first unified comparative analysis 
of the erosion of collective bargaining coverage to complement recent disparate studies 
of union density in each country. 
 
3. Data 
The German data are taken from the IAB Establishment Panel. The Panel is based on a 
stratified random sample of the plants2 – the strata are currently defined over 17 
industries and 10 employment size categories – from the population of all 
establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance (see Fischer et 
al., 2009). The basis for sampling is the Federal Employment Agency establishment 
file, containing some 2 million establishments. The panel was set up in 1993 for western 
Germany so as to provide a representative information system permitting continuous 
analysis of labor demand. It was applied to eastern Germany in 1996 and is therefore 
now nationwide in its coverage. From the outset the IAB Establishment panel was 
intended as a longitudinal survey, so that a large majority of the same plants are 
interviewed each year. To correct for panel mortality, exits, and newly founded firms, 
however, the data are augmented regularly. Taken in conjunction with other extension 
samples (to allow regional analysis at the federal state level), the panel has grown over 
time and now the number of plants surveyed is around 16,000 units. 
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The survey is generally carried out in the form of face-to-face interviews, with 
written postal surveys also being undertaken in some federal states. The overall 
response rate to the surveys has varied between 63 percent and 73 percent. It is lower 
for first-time respondents and for the written surveys. But the response rate for the 
orally-interviewed continuing establishments is stable at between 81 percent and 84 
percent. (On the cross-sectional and longitudinal weighting procedures, see Fischer et 
al., 2009.) 
We restrict the German data to the 1998 and 2004 cross-sections of the IAB 
Establishment Panel to maintain correspondence with the two British workplace 
surveys. The German raw sample contains a total of some 25,451 observations: 9,762 
from the 1998 survey and 15,689 observations from the 2004 survey.  
The British data are taken from the 1998 and 2004 WERS. These are cross-
sectional surveys based on stratified random samples of workplaces taken from the 
Inter-Departmental Business Register which contains the population of establishments 
in Britain which are subject to VAT or maintain tax records for the purpose of paying 
employees. The survey covers all sectors of the British economy with the exception of 
mining and quarrying; agriculture, hunting, and forestry; fishing; private households 
with employed persons; and extraterritorial bodies. However, for the purposes of the 
present exercise, we confine our attention to private-sector workplaces. The unit of 
analysis is the workplace, namely a place of employment at a single address or site. For 
the 1998 WERS the population was all workplaces with at least 10 employees. For the 
2004 WERS, however, the employment threshold was lowered to 5 employees. We 
retain the 10 employee threshold to ensure comparability across the two British surveys. 
(Filters were applied to the German data to provide a comparable sample, including the 
public sector and size restrictions.) 
All independent variables are collected in face-to-face interviews with the senior 
manager responsible for employment relations on a day-to-day basis. The response rate 
was 80 percent in 1998 and 65 percent in 2004. As in the German case, we apply 
sample weights so that our analyses are nationally representative of private-sector 
workplaces in Britain with 10 or more employees (For full details of the two surveys, 
see Chaplin et al., 2005; Airey et al., 1999.)  
Most of the variables used in our analysis are self-explanatory, but two of them 
deserve some additional explanation. First, the definition of a ‘leading region’ in Britain 
is London and the South East of England, whereas for Germany it is simply western 
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Germany. Second, the ‘proportion of skilled workers’ in Britain is based on the 
proportion of employees in the workplace in skilled occupations, defined as those in 
managerial, professional, technical, clerical, and skilled craft occupations. For 
Germany, the definition comprises skilled manual workers together with employees in 
jobs requiring a vocational qualification or comparable training on the job or relevant 
professional experience, and those in jobs requiring a university degree or higher 
education.  
The German establishment panel identifies whether or not the establishment is 
bound by an industry-wide agreement, a company agreement concluded by the 
establishment and the trade unions, or no collective agreement at all.3 The British data 
contain two measures of collective bargaining. The first is based on whether there is an 
agreement, be it at workplace, organization or sectoral level, to recognize one or more 
unions to bargain over terms and conditions for employees at the surveyed workplace.4 
This recognition measure is that which has traditionally been used in analyses of 
workplace unionization in Britain, going back to the first workplace survey in 1980 
(Blanchflower, Bryson, and Forth, 2007).  However, in the 1998 and 2004 surveys new 
questions were introduced that inquired of the workplace manager how pay was set for 
each single-digit occupational group in the workplace. Specifically, for each occupation 
present the manager was now asked: “Which of the following statements most closely 
characterizes the way that pay is set for [occupational group]?” The first three pre-coded 
answers are: “collective bargaining for more than one employer (e.g. industry-wide 
agreement);” “collective bargaining at an organization level;” “collective bargaining at 
this workplace.” From this information we construct variables identifying any collective 
bargaining, any sectoral-level collective bargaining, and any firm-level (workplace or 
organization) collective bargaining.   
It is notable that the incidence of collective bargaining is higher using the former 
‘union recognition’ measure than the alternative ‘any collective agreement’ derived 
from the occupation-specific tranche of questions (see Table 1 below). This may be 
because the latter is interpreted by respondents as active collective bargaining during the 
year of the survey, whereas union recognition may also include workplaces where an 
agreement to negotiate over wages is in place, but where no actual bargaining occurred 
in the survey year, either because the pay agreement is not due for renewal in that year 
or because the agreement is dormant (Kersley et al., 2006; Millward, Bryson, and Forth, 
2000). To obtain a complete picture, although our focus will be upon the conventional 
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union recognition variable, we shall supplement this discussion with an analysis of 
collective agreements of any type so as to consider not only the correlates of active 
bargaining but also how these may differ by bargaining gradient (i.e. industry-level 
versus establishment/organization-level agreements). 
We also report results for another indicator of worker representation at the 
workplace, namely the presence of a joint consultative committee (JCCs). These 
committees are akin to works councils in Germany in terms of their responsibilities and 
operations, although the workplace-level JCCs we consider here do not receive the sort 
of statutory backing or authority enjoyed by works councils. 
 
4. Modeling    
Our study of union decline between, say, t0 and t1 is based on the standard Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition (or multivariate shift-share analysis) in which the outcome of 
interest, Y  (here the collective bargaining measure relevant to the workplace), is 
conditional on a set of observed characteristics X . Accordingly, for a given country j (in 
our case, Britain and Germany), we have  
1 1 1t t t
Y X B u= + ,         (1) 
and 
0 0 0
't t tY X B u= + .          (2) 
The aggregate change in the outcome variable tΔ  is therefore 
1 0 1 1 0 0t t t t t t t
y y x b x bΔ = − = − ,         (3) 
where y  denotes the mean outcome, x  the mean vector of characteristics, and b  the 
corresponding coefficient estimates, obtained from (1) and (2) in separate OLS 
regressions.  
After adding and subtracting 
1 0t t
x b  from (3), we have the two-component 
decomposition 
1 0 0 1 1 0
( ) ( )t t t t t t tx x b x b bΔ = − + − ,        (4) 
where the first term on the right-hand-side gives the ‘explained’ component, that is, the 
part of the observed change allocated to differences in observable characteristics (the 
between or compositional effect) while the second gives the ‘unexplained’ component  
(the within or behavioral effect), namely the change in the outcome occasioned by  
differences in the rates of return (‘propen sities’) from period t0 to period t1.5  
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We are also interested in analyzing differences in outcomes across countries at a 
given point in time. In this case, and now denoting countries by subscripts – 1 for 
Germany and 0 for Britain – the decomposition is given by  
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0( ) ( )j y y x x b x b bΔ = − = − + − ,       (5) 
where y  and x  again denote mean vectors for the dependent and independent variables 
respectively and b  are the coefficient estimates obtained from the separate OLS 
regressions: 1 1 1Y X B u= +  and 0 0 0 'Y X B u= + . 
To keep our implementation as simple as possible, we rely on linear estimates 
for our decompositions. Given that our outcome measures are binary variables, this 
procedure estimates (omitting subscripts) the familiar linear probability model: 
Y XB u= + . But note that since we are mainly interested in mean values rather than the 
individual probability of a given establishment being covered by collective bargaining, 
our treatment does not entail any risk that the predicted probability of the sampling 
means falls outside the 0–1 range. 
In our analysis we select two main outcome variables: (a) whether or not the 
establishment is covered by a collective agreement (or a recognized union in the case of 
Britain); and (b) whether or not it has a representative council (works council in the case 
of Germany and a workplace joint consultative committee for Britain). For 
completeness, and as intimated above, we shall also report the case where the dependent 
variable measures the presence of a firm or a sectoral collective agreement. Our 
explanatory variables – common to the two countries – comprise industry and 
establishment size dummies, measures of workforce composition (skill, gender, and 
working time status), foreign ownership, single versus multi-site firm status, 
establishment age, and region. 
 
5. Findings 
Table 1 presents the means of the variables in 1998 and 2004 and the corresponding 
percentage point/percentage changes in these values over the period. The first five rows 
of the table contain the outcome measures, while the workplace characteristics are 
reported in the remaining rows. Throughout the means are computed using sample 
weights so as to guarantee their representativeness with respect to the underlying 
population. 
(Table 1 near here) 
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The incidence of collective bargaining has declined markedly in Britain and 
Germany (row 1), the percentage point decline being twice as large for union 
recognition in Britain as it is for collective bargaining in Germany (11.4 versus 5.8 
percentage points). The rate of decline – measured as a percentage of collective 
bargaining in the base period – is one-and-a-half times faster in Britain (viz. 30 percent 
compared with around 20 percent in Germany). Nevertheless, levels of collective 
bargaining coverage remain considerably higher in Germany than in Britain throughout 
the period. In the British case, although the incidence of (any) collective bargaining 
coverage is lower than union recognition, its recorded absolute and relative decline is 
higher, a finding consistent with  a further ‘hollowing out’ of union bargaining in 
Britain. 
Sectoral bargaining predominates in Germany: multiemployer agreements are 
ten times more common than firm agreements. In Britain, on the other hand, sectoral 
bargaining appears to be an endangered species – even before the start of our sample 
period. Firm-level collective bargaining is considerably more stable over time than 
sectoral bargaining for both countries and its incidence is higher in Britain than in 
Germany throughout the period. 
There are also substantial differences in worker representation in the two 
countries, as measured by works councils in Germany and joint consultative committees 
in Britain. Works councils are more common in Germany than workplace joint 
consultative committees are in Britain.  Furthermore, the incidence of works councils is 
stable whereas joint consultative committees are in decline.6 
Table 1 also reviews the other workplace characteristics for both countries that 
we use in our shift-share analyses.  The distribution of establishment size (as measured 
by number of employees), establishment age, and workforce composition (skill, gender, 
and hours of work), seem to be quite similar across countries. Differences are apparent 
with respect to foreign ownership (twice as high in Britain), and industry composition 
(e.g. the preponderance of the financial sector and hotels and restaurants in Britain, and 
the greater importance of construction in Germany). There are also sizeable differences 
in the importance of ‘residual’ sectors such as other business and services and 
community services in the two countries.  However, the biggest difference between 
Britain and Germany relates to single versus multiple establishment firms: in Germany 
single establishment firms (‘independent’ companies) constitute four-fifths of the 
private sector, as compared with only two-fifths in Britain.  
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(Tables 2a and 2b near here) 
Table 2a presents the incidence of collective bargaining and union recognition in 
Germany and Britain by workplace characteristics. In Germany, collective bargaining 
incidence is above average in sectors like utilities, construction, hotels and restaurants, 
transport and communications, and financial services. It is below average in 
manufacturing, health, education, and other business services. In Britain, utilities, 
education, health, and transport and communications, education, and health exceed the 
country mean for recognition. Looking across countries, coverage rates diverge least in 
utilities, education, and health. For the remaining sectors, coverage is much higher in 
Germany, often dramatically so. The decline in coverage in Germany is concentrated 
among establishments with 200 or fewer employees, while in Britain it is concentrated 
in workplaces with 10-20 and 201-999 employees. In both countries the decline in the 
incidence of collective bargaining and union recognition is to a large extent across-the 
board, even if some marked ‘individual’ differences are apparent. Table 2b in contrast 
indicates that, although the frequency of works councils and joint consultative 
committees varies quite substantially across industries and establishment size 
categories, the presence of these worker representation institutions is (with a few 
exceptions, mostly for Britain) fairly stable over time. 
(Table 3 near here) 
Table 3 – which forms the basis of the decomposition exercise below – presents 
our linear probability estimates of an establishment having a collective agreement of 
any type (Germany) or a recognized union (Britain).7 The first column of the table pools 
the German data for 1998 and 2004. It  shows that, all else constant, only the other 
business services, education, and health sectors evince a statistically significant lower 
probability of coverage than manufacturing (the reference sector), while the role of 
establishment size is well-determined (the larger the establishment, the greater the 
probability of coverage).  The fourth column repeats the same pooled analysis for 
Britain. It indicates that utilities have a higher probability of union recognition than 
manufacturing, whereas wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, other 
business services, and community services all have a lower probability. These results 
hold, with a few exceptions, for the separate year regressions given in the second/third 
and fifth/sixth columns for Germany and Britain, respectively. Further, foreign 
ownership, single establishment status and establishment ‘youth’ decrease the 
 12 
 
probability of being covered, especially in Germany. However, no particular pattern 
emerges from workforce composition.  
The coefficient estimate for the time dummy (2004) of –0.124 for Germany in 
the first column of the table is a little higher than the observed decline of 11.4 
percentage points (earlier reported in Table 1), suggesting that the contribution of the 
compositional effect to change is likely to be low. Put differently, holding 
characteristics constant, the coefficient estimate for the time dummy implies a 12.4 
percentage point decline, implying that the within-effect will tend to dominate. 
In the case of Britain, the coefficient of the time dummy (–0.056) also mirrors 
quite closely the observed raw decline of 5.8 percentage points (see Table 1) in the 
union recognition measure over the period 1998-2004. As in the case of Germany, 
therefore, the compositional effect for Britain is expected to be low as well.  
Results for pooled country data are provided in the last three columns of Table 
3. The coefficient estimate for the German establishment variable gives the increased 
probability of an establishment in that country being covered by a collective agreement 
of any type relative to Britain, having controlled for observable workplace 
characteristics. In the regression for 1998, for example, this coefficient is equal to 0.453 
which is slightly higher than the observed 1998 gap between the two countries of 0.422 
(again see Table 1). For 2004, as can be seen from the final column of the table, the 
disparity is larger: 0.422 rather than 0.366 (Table 1). (Note that the coefficient estimate 
for the German establishment variable in the seventh column of the table is roughly the 
average of the 1998 and 2004 coefficients reported in the separate regressions.) The 
implication is that there is something about being in Germany, rather than Britain, and 
not accounted for by characteristics at workplace-level that markedly elevate the 
probability of collective bargaining coverage. This latter result will of course come as 
no surprise to proponents of the varieties-of-capitalism school who tend to emphasize 
the role of macro-institutional features and political economy considerations. Finally, 
the time dummy of –8.1 percent very roughly approximates the observed decline in the 
German-British union representation gap of 5.6 percentage points earlier shown in 
Table 1. 
(Table 4a near here) 
  Our multivariate shift-share analysis is summarized in panels (a) through (e) of 
Table 4a.  The estimates are derived from the decomposition exercise described in 
equation (4) by type of institution: collective bargaining coverage and worker 
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representation. Rows (4) and (5) of each panel give the proportions of the observed 
change in outcome that are due to the compositional effect and the within-effect, 
respectively. The compositional effect is computed assuming base-year (1998) 
propensities as the reference category, while the within-effect is, by definition, simply 
the difference between the actual change and the compositional effect. These effects are 
computed for Germany and Britain from separate regressions. 
The most striking feature of the table is the magnitude of the within-effect 
throughout. In the case of Germany, for example, had the propensities (coefficients) 
assumed the same level in 1998 and 2004, collective bargaining coverage would have 
been virtually unchanged over the sample period (63.7 percent rather than 62.5 percent). 
Given that the observed coverage rate in 2004 is 51.1 percent, it follows that the decline 
in collective bargaining coverage in Germany is due in its entirety to a change in 
behavior. (Changes in the characteristics of workplaces over the period were actually 
favorable toward collective bargaining.) As shown in panels (c) and (d), these results 
also hold for the cases of sectoral bargaining and firm-level agreements.  
In Britain, the within-effect is also the major driving force in explaining the 
change in union recognition over time, accounting for about 80 percent of the observed 
decline. In the case of panels (b) through (d), that now refer to union coverage – our 
secondary measure of collective bargaining in Britain – the small magnitudes involved 
(just 10.6 percent of plants were covered by any type of collective bargaining in 2004 
compared with 16.9 percent in 1998) probably mean that the precision of the estimates 
should be regarded with caution. Nevertheless, for this measure the within-effect plays 
an even larger role than for union recognition. 
Panel (e) of Table 4a presents the decomposition with respect to works councils 
and JCCs. In the light of the strong stability of the former institution over the period (the 
observed percentage point change is only 0.6 percentage points over the six years), there 
is not much to be said about the distinct roles of compositional versus behavioral effects 
given the magnitudes involved. But as far as British joint consultative committees are 
concerned, the observed 4.4 percentage point decline in coverage is again mostly due to 
the within-effect. 
We note parenthetically that these results are robust to model specification. In 
Appendix Table 1, we show the results of a decomposition exercise in which a ‘full’ 
model is specified for each country and are again able to point to the dominance of the 
within-effect, albeit with a fairly pronounced tendency for the contribution of 
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compositional change to be higher in the case of Britain in the first and second 
columns.8  
Neither do our results seem to be sensitive to weighting. In Appendix Table 2 
we replicate Table 4a with unweighted data. Despite the fact that the unweighted figures 
on collective agreement coverage and union recognition are obviously higher – large 
establishments are over-represented in both surveys and size and coverage are positively 
correlated – the share of the within-effect is pretty much the same: 108.6 percent for 
Germany and 78.2 percent for Britain in the unweighted case, and 110.9 percent and 
78.2 percent in the weighted case (see Table 4a), respectively. Accordingly the primacy 
of the within-effect is undisturbed if we work with unweighted data. 
(Table 4b near here) 
We have noted that the gap between collective bargaining coverage between 
Germany and Britain is roughly 40 percentage points and that this gap does not change 
very much over the period.  We can use our estimates to answer the question: had 
British workplaces been endowed with the German characteristics would they have had 
the (high) German collective bargaining coverage? Table 4b shows the results of this 
exercise. We find that differences in the distribution of observable workplace 
characteristics across Germany and Britain account for around one-tenth of the disparity 
in collective bargaining across countries, so that roughly 90 percent is due to differences 
in the betas for each characteristic in the two countries.  This ‘unexplained’ component 
(which is often attributed to discrimination in the gender wage gap literature) may, in 
this case, be attributable to employer tastes for union wage setting which are due, in 
part, to very different historical, political and industrial relations institutions in Germany 
relative to Britain.9  
These results also hold up rather well in the case of any type of collective 
agreement (shown in panel (b)) or sectoral agreements (panel (c)). Interestingly, the 
small German-British gap in firm-level bargaining (panel (d)) shows an opposite 
pattern: the compositional effect is dominant in both 1998 and 2004. Thus, holding 
workplace characteristics constant, the two countries have roughly the same 
propensities to engage in firm-level agreements.  
(Table 5 near here) 
 Finally, Table 5 presents a counterfactual exercise in which the German (British) 
coefficients or propensities are applied to British (German) characteristics in each of the 
two sample years, 1998 and 2004. The exercise is carried out for all selected outcome 
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variables, and the most interesting finding, as shown in the first two columns of the 
table, is that Britain would very much resemble Germany if the British establishments 
recorded the same ‘behavior’ as their German counterparts. In 1998, for example: the 
gap between the observed collective bargaining coverage in Germany and the 
counterfactual coverage rate would be a striking 3.3 percentage points (or 62.5–59.2); 
whereas in 2004 it would be 4.2 percentage points (51.1 – 46.9). Over time, the 
percentage point change of –12.3 would, in turn, broadly mimic the observed 
percentage point change of –11.4 (in Table 4a, panel (a)). 
 Applying the British propensities to Germany workplaces produces a British-
like situation, although with less ‘precision’ than in the previous exercise. In fact, as the 
last two columns of the table demonstrate, the figures in panels (a) through (e) tend to 
be lower than the corresponding values observed for Britain in either 1998 or 2004 
(again refer to Table 4a). We can mostly attribute this larger gap to differences in the 
mean of the single establishment variable. As a practical matter, replication of the last 
two columns purged of this variable yields a much smaller difference between observed 
and counterfactual coverage rates of roughly 3 percentage points. (Counterfactual 
results without the single-establishment dummy are available from the authors upon 
request.) In any event, note that the 1998-2004 percentage point changes reported in 
Table 5 are very much in line with the observed changes reported in Table 4a. 
Consequently, the main results are as follows: first, in both countries workplace 
behavior changes very little though time; and, second, the two countries differ 
substantially in their behavior for a given set of workplace characteristics. Vulgo: 
propensities by country mean everything in terms of cross-country differences in 
collective bargaining and worker representation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have charted the incidence of and changes in collective 
bargaining/workplace representation, 1998-2004, estimating a common model of the 
determinants of coverage for Germany and Britain, both severally and jointly. Ours is 
the first comparative study seeking to understand the factors behind the recent, 
substantial decline in private sector collective bargaining in Germany and Britain. Our 
treatment does five things.  First, it quantifies the extent of that decline at the level of 
the workplace. Second, it establishes the role of compositional change in workplace 
characteristics in contributing to this decline. Interestingly, the only other study to use 
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this workplace-based approach and which covers a 24-year period of decline recovers 
much the same percentage change attributable to compositional change as do we for the 
single country – Britain – it examines. Third, it considers the extent to which 
differences in workplace characteristics across Germany and Britain can account for the 
gap in the frequency of collective bargaining between the two countries. Fourth, it 
undertakes similar analyses in respect of works councils and joint consultative 
committees, those other main institutional pillars of worker representation in the two 
countries. Finally, the results are supported in sensitivity analyses.   
We find evidence of a strong and persistent decline in collective bargaining in 
Germany and Britain since the late 1990s. By 2004, just over 50 percent of German 
establishments were covered by a collective agreement, down 11 percentage points on 
six years earlier.  At around 15 percent, the union recognition rate in Britain was less 
than one-third that of Germany, having fallen by over one-quarter in the previous six 
years.  Projecting this 6-year rate of decline forward another six years to 2010 implies 
only 40 percent of German private-sector establishments will be covered by any type of 
collective agreement while the rate in Britain will be around 10 percent.  
We have found that the decline in collective bargaining incidence in both 
countries is mostly due to changes in behavior rather than to compositional effects.  
This outcome is not particularly surprising since workplace characteristics have not 
changed that much over this relatively short time frame. Nevertheless, it is striking that 
the decline is apparent in virtually every type of workplace, albeit to different degrees. 
There are few, if any, impregnable bastions of unionism left in these two nations.  
A comparison of workplace characteristics across Germany and Britain revealed 
a number of substantial differences, perhaps the most important of which was the much 
greater incidence of single independent establishments in the former country. The lower 
propensity of single-establishment firms to embrace collective bargaining compared 
with their multi-site counterparts suggests that the gap in collective bargaining between 
Germany and Britain might get even bigger if such differences were accounted for. Yet, 
compositional differences in workplace characteristics accounted for about one-tenth of 
the 40 percentage point gap in collective bargaining incidence between Germany and 
Britain. The rest, manifested in pooled country equations as a large coefficient estimate 
for the ‘Germany’ dummy, remains unexplained. But the British deficit is likely to 
capture country-level differences in history, culture and institutions, as well as some 
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residual unobserved workplace-level factors. Interestingly, the size of the ‘Germany’ 
effect remained relatively stable over the period under investigation. 
The cross-country pattern of decline in worker representation differs in one main 
aspect. Although works councils seemingly remain strong in Germany over the sample 
period, their British counterpart – the joint consultative committee – is emphatically in 
decline. This trend has occurred despite moves in Britain to institutionalize forms of 
worker representation other than union recognition, some of them inspired by European 
legislation on information and consultation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 For a moment-in-time analysis of the determinants of ‘never membership’ in German 
trade unions, see Schnabel and Wagner (2006). 
 
2 Large plants are oversampled but the sampling within each cell is random. 
 
3 Interestingly, the German survey goes on to ask of those establishments not bound by 
a collective agreement whether or not they nevertheless oriented themselves toward an 
industry-wide collective agreement. 
 
4. Once the survey interviewer has established that there is a union at the workplace the 
manager is asked: “Is the [NAME OF UNION] recognized by management for 
negotiating pay and conditions for any sections of the workforce in this establishment? 
(INTERVIEWER: If agreements are negotiated with the union at a higher level in the 
organisation or by an employers association, but apply to union/staff association 
members here, count as recognized).” 
 
5 We do not implement a three-component decomposition which can be derived 
similarly to yield 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
( ) ( ) ( )( )t t t t t t t t t t tx x b x b b x x b bΔ = − + − + − − , where the third 
term is the interaction of the composition and within-group effects. Consistent with the 
literature, our assumption is that the third term is neglible.  
 
6 Had we defined our sample more restrictively, very modest declines in works councils 
would be evident at the establishment level. For details, see Addison et al. (2009); see 
also Hassel (1999).  
 
7 Similar regressions for the other outcome variables – any collective agreement for 
Britain, sectoral- and firm-level agreements for both countries, and works councils and 
JCCs for Germany and Britain, respectively – are available on request. 
 
8 Although the extended set of regressors in Appendix Table 1 is limited to the addition 
of industry and regional controls in the case of Germany and regional and detailed 
workforce composition controls in the case of Britain, there is a good reason for this: we 
sought to keep the specifications for the two countries as close as possible to facilitate 
comparisons between them. 
 
9 We note that by following the procedures suggested by Jann (2008) we get virtually 
the same results. As a further robustness check, we also examined the sensitivity of the 
results to whether we take the British or German coefficients as the reference category. 
Our procedure followed again Jann (2008), who suggested a weighting method based on 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994). The results from this exercise indicate that despite 
differences in magnitude the within-effect continues to dominate. 
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TABLE 1 
Workplace Mean Characteristics in Germany and Britain, Survey-
Weighted Data, 1998 and 2004 
 
 
Variables 
Germany Britain 
1998 2004 p.p.c. p.c. 1998 2004 p.p.c. p.c. 
Any collective agreement/union recognition  62.5 51.1 -11.4 -18.2 20.3 14.5 -5.8 -28.7 
Any collective agreement 62.5 51.1 -11.4 -18.2 16.9 10.6 -6.3 -37.2 
Sectoral-level agreement 56.9 47.1 -9.8 -17.2 4.2 1.8 -2.4 -57.2 
Firm-level agreement 5.6 4.0 -1.6 -28.5 8.3 7.7 -0.6 -7.4 
Works councils/JCCs 17.0 17.6 0.6 3.5 14.5 10.1 -4.4 -30.3 
Manufacturing   25.8 21.4 -4.4 -17.1 17.6 14.4 -3.2 -18.2 
Utilities 0.4 0.7 0.3 72.1 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -26.2 
Construction 15.4 10.6 -4.8 -30.9 6.5 5.0 -1.5 -23.0 
Wholesale and retail trade 26.3 25.6 -0.7 -2.5 25.5 25.8 0.3 1.1 
Hotels and restaurants 6.6 6.7 0.1 1.2 10.6 11.0 0.4 4.2 
Transport and communications 5.6 6.7 1.1 20.2 5.3 5.3 0.0 0.8 
Financial services 0.9 1.8 0.9 91.4 12.9 13.5 0.6 4.6 
Other business services 11.3 16.1 4.8 42.0 5.7 7.3 1.5 26.7 
Education 0.9 0.9 0.0 1.5 2.9 1.3 -1.6 -54.9 
Health 4.8 6.5 1.7 36.4 3.8 4.2 0.4 10.4 
Community services 2.0 3.0 1.0 50.0 9.0 12.0 3.0 33.7 
Leading region 74.2 81.7 7.6 10.2 29.2 25.8 -3.4 -11.7 
Size 10-20  58.8 56.3 -2.5 -4.3 52.8 51.5 -1.3 -2.5 
Size 21-100 34.6 36.5 1.9 5.5 38.6 40.6 2.0 5.1 
Size 101-200 3.8 4.2 0.4 11.9 5.1 4.5 -0.6 -11.7 
Size 201-499 2.1 2.3 0.2 11.7 2.7 2.6 -0.1 -4.4 
Size 500-999 0.4 0.5 0.1 13.6 0.6 0.6 0.0 3.4 
Size ≥1, 000 0.3 0.2 0.0 -4.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 -9.1 
Foreign owned 3.1 4.2 1.1 35.5 7.7 11.3 3.7 47.6 
Single establishment 81.3 77.9 -3.3 -4.1 40.2 38.1 -2.1 -5.2 
Establishment older than 10 years 69.7 77.6 7.8 11.2 66.9 72.9 6.0 8.9 
Proportion female workers 39.7 41.5 1.8 4.5 47.9 48.4 0.5 1.1 
Proportion part-time workers 21.8 20.3 -1.5 -6.7 28.6 30.4 1.8 6.4 
Proportion skilled workers 57.0 62.8 5.8 10.1 54.6 46.9 -7.7 -14.0 
   Sources: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS 1998 and 2004.  
   Notes: p.p.c. and p.c. denote percentage point change and percentage change in the mean values,                
respectively.  All variables are 1, 0 dummies, with mean values given in percentages. 
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TABLE 2a 
Incidence of Collective Bargaining of Any Type/Union Recognition in 
Germany and Britain by Workplace Characteristics, Weighted Data, 1998 and 
2004 
 
 
Variables 
Germany 
(Collective agreement) 
Britain 
(Union recognition) 
1998 2004 p.p c. 1998 2004 p.p c. 
Manufacturing         56.7 44.9 -11.8 16.8 8.9 -7.9 
Utilities 96.8 73.3 -23.5 97.9 94.9 -3.0 
Construction 76.1 73.8 -2.3 24.2 9.4 -14.8 
Wholesale and retail trade 70.9 59.7 -11.2 14.7 9.8 -4.9 
Hotels and restaurants 85.4 66.3 -19.1 2.6 0.3 -2.3 
Transport and communications 77.1 55.4 -21.7 33.5 19.6 -13.9 
Financial services 81.2 79.4 -1.8 24.8 33.1 8.3 
Other business services 23.8 24.0 0.2  6.3 1.7 -4.6 
Education 30.7 33.3 2.6 43.8 26.1 -17.7 
Health 41.1 33.5 -7.6 31.2 11.7 -19.5 
Community services 78.5 34.0 -44.5 9.9 14.5 4.6 
Leading region 68.2 54.7 -13.5 12.7 11.0 -1.7 
Size 10-20             56.2 49.2 -7.0 33.1 21.3 -11.8 
Size 21-100 68.4 56.5 -11.9 19.4 16.3 -3.1 
Size 101-200 81.3 65.2 -16.1 38.8 36.8 -2 
Size 201-499 78.8 78.0 -0.8 54.8 48.3 -6.5 
Size 500-999 94.8 88.5 -6.3 61.4 43.8 -17.6 
Size ≥1000 98.5 95.0 -3.5 66.6 61.1 -5.5 
Foreign owned 61.8 53.3 -8.5 15.8 14.2 -1.6 
Single establishment 59.9 46.9 -13 12.4 4.8 -7.6 
Establishment older than 10 years 67.9 54.2 -13.7 19.8 16.7 -3.1 
Sources: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS 1998 and 2004.  
Note: See notes to Table 1. 
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TABLE 2b 
Incidence of Works Councils/Joint Consultative Committees in Germany 
and Britain by Workplace Characteristics, Weighted Data, 1998 and 2004 
 
 
Variables 
Germany 
(Works councils)  
United Kingdom 
(Joint consultative committees) 
1998 2004 p.p c. 1998 2004 p.p c. 
Manufacturing   24.6 24.1 -0.5 20.7 19.2 -1.5 
Utilities  57.6 56.7 -0.9 55.3 54.8 -0.5 
Construction  10.7 11.2 0.5 5.3 3.9 -1.4 
Wholesale and retail trade 13.7 17.7 4.0 12.5 10.7 -1.8 
Hotels and restaurants 3.6 3.9 0.3 6.5 3.0 -3.5 
Transport and communications 31.3 24.7 -6.6 12.5 13.0 0.5 
Financial services  52.4 52.6 0.2 13.7 9.5 -4.2 
Other business services 13.2 13.6 0.4 19.8 6.5 -13.3 
Education 25.9 30.2 4.3 19.9 11.6 -8.3 
Health 14.7 11.0 -3.7 13.7 5.7 -8.0 
Community services 16.1 10.2 -5.9 20.4 9.5 -10.9 
Leading region 17.8 17.4 -0.4 15.1 9.3 -5.8 
Size 10-20 4.3 5.3 1.0 9.0 2.8 -6.2 
Size 21-100 26.7 25.7 -1.0 16.0 12.1 -3.9 
Size 101-200 76.5 64.5 -12.0 35.8 41.2 5.4 
Size 201-499 84.4 80.8 -3.6 49.6 53.5 3.9 
Size 500-999 88.3 93.5 5.2 48.4 67.5 19.1 
Size 1000+ 98.7 97.8 -0.9 63.1 65.4 2.3 
Foreign owned 49.5 50.7 1.2 20.5 14.0 -6.5 
Single establishment 11.7 10.7 -1.0 16.1 4.5 -11.6 
Establishment older than 10 years 19.2 18.8 -0.4 13.8 10.1 -3.7 
Sources: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS 1998 and 2004.  
Note: See notes to Tables 1 and 2a. 
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TABLE 3 
Linear Probability Estimates of an Establishment Having a Collective Agreement of Any Type/Union Recognition in Germany 
and Britain, Weighted Data, 1998 and 2004 
 
 
Variables 
Germany Britain Pooled data 
1998 and 2004 1998 2004 1998 and 2004 1998 2004 1998 and 2004 1998 2004 
Utilities 0.230 *** 0.317 *** 0.182 *** 0.566 *** 0.500 *** 0.634 *** 0.288 *** 0.376 *** 0.242 *** 
(0.046)  (0.061)  (0.053)  (0.048)  (0.073)  (0.062)  (0.042)  (0.057)  (0.053)  
Construction 0.294 *** 0.276 *** 0.312 *** -0.540  -0.073  -0.051  0.162 *** 0.149 *** 0.174 *** 
(0.031)  (0.047)  (0.035)  (0.064)  (0.116)  (0.049)  (0.033)  (0.057)  (0.031)  
Wholesale and retail trade 0.114 *** 0.147 *** 0.082 ** -0.197 *** -0.220 *** -0.171 *** -0.012  -0.001  -0.020  
(0.032)  (0.051)  (0.035)  (0.425)  (0.073)  (0.412)  (0.027)  (0.046)  (0.027)  
Hotels and restaurants 0.275 *** 0.320 *** 0.226 *** -0.296 *** -0.379 *** -0.234 *** -0.028  -0.018  -0.032  
(0.049)  (0.075)  (0.059)  (0.047)  (0.086)  (0.043)  (0.036)  (0.062)  (0.036)  
Transport and 
communications 
0.127 *** 0.214 *** 0.061  -0.159  -0.003  -0.033  0.065 * 0.012 * 0.027  
(0.041)  (0.059)  (0.049)  (0.065)  (0.117)  (0.056)  (0.037)  (0.067)  (0.036)  
Financial services 0.192 *** 0.181  0.186 *** 0.225  -0.076  0.114 ** 0.095 ** 0.024  0.148 *** 
(0.060)  (0.110)  (0.062)  (0.051)  (0.083)  (0.056)  (0.040)  (0.065)  (0.045)  
Other business services -0.257 *** -0.314 *** -0.232 *** -0.216 *** -0.268 *** -0.162 *** -0.263 *** -0.311 *** -0.230 *** 
(0.033)  (0.061)  (0.032)  (0.044)  (0.080)  (0.040)  (0.029)  (0.053)  (0.027)  
Education -0.167 * 0.160  -0.185 ** 0.087  0.121  0.025  0.015  0.072  -0.058  
(0.097)  (0.187)  (0.086)  (0.105)  (0.152)  (0.095)  (0.087)  (0.145)  (0.064)  
Health -0.140 ** -0.142  -0.151 ** -0.045  0.031  -0.096  -0.104 ** -0.055  -0.137 *** 
(0.067)  (0.129)  (0.063)  (0.073)  (0.134)  (0.062)  (0.052)  (0.102)  (0.046)  
Community services 0.000  0.261 *** -0.137 ** -0.127 ** -0.202 ** -0.069  -0.045  -0.052  -0.040  
(0.066)  (0.090)  (0.060)  (0.050)  (0.080)  (0.056)  (0.036)  (0.059)  (0.040)  
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Leading region 0.211 *** 0.231 *** 0.197 *** -0.072 *** -0.101 *** -0.061 *** 0.050 *** 0.056 ** 0.045 *** 
(0.019)  (0.033)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.022)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.016)  
Size 21-100 0.102 *** 0.098 *** 0.101 *** 0.030  0.005  0.061 ** 0.069 *** 0.062 ** 0.078 *** 
(0.019)  (0.031)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.042)  (0.024)  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.017)  
Size101-200 0.206 *** 0.219 *** 0.186 *** 0.183 *** 0.165 *** 0.208 *** 0.202 *** 0.217 *** 0.195 *** 
(0.025)  (0.038)  (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.533)  (0.044)  (0.022)  (0.035)  (0.028)  
Size 201-499 0.271 *** 0.217 *** 0.303 *** 0.302 *** 0.294 *** 0.321 *** 0.306 *** 0.295 *** 0.321 *** 
(0.028)  (0.048)  (0.029)  (0.034)  (0.055)  (0.043)  (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.027)  
Size 500-999 0.406 *** 0.343 *** 0.421 *** 0.296 *** 0.355 *** 0.265 *** 0.364 *** 0.400 *** 0.343 *** 
(0.028)  (0.041)  (0.035)  (0.043)  (0.069)  (0.054)  (0.028)  (0.044)  (0.035)  
Size ≥1000 0.386 *** 0.321 *** 0.424 *** 0.402 *** 0.399 *** 0.414 *** 0.400 *** 0.384 *** 0.419 *** 
(0.027)  (0.043)  (0.031)  (0.049)  (0.081)  (0.063)  (0.030)  (0.051)  (0.035)  
Foreign owned -0.113 *** -0.134  -0.104 ** -0.104 *** -0.149 *** -0.067 ** -0.110 *** -0.155 *** -0.086 *** 
(0.041)  (0.082)  (0.041)  (0.027)  (0.046)  (0.032)  (0.024)  (0.041)  (0.027)  
Single establishment -0.120 *** -0.084 ** -0.148 *** -0.162 *** -0.174 *** -0.139 *** -0.135 *** -0.127 *** -0.137 *** 
(0.041)  (0.035)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.043)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.033)  (0.018)  
Establishment older than 
10 years 
0.085 *** 0.093 ** 0.076 *** 0.023  -0.016  0.069 *** 0.065 *** 0.056 * 0.077 *** 
(0.025)  (0.042)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.048)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.018)  
Proportion female workers 0.027  0.045  0.023  -0.016  -0.072  0.026  0.050  0.056  0.053  
(0.048)  (0.084)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.095)  (0.050)  (0.036)  (0.068)  (0.036)  
Proportion part-time 
workers 
0.012  -0.091  0.069  0.084 * 0.122  0.053  0.000  -0.044  0.031  
(0.057)  (0.097)  (0.063)  (0.051)  (0.095)  (0.050)  (0.039)  (0.073)  (0.040)  
Proportion skilled workers 0.103 *** 0.073  0.110 ** -0.046  -0.002  -0.080 * 0.000  0.004  0.000  
(0.037)  (0.057)  (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.069)  (0.044)  (0.029)  (0.049)  (0.032)  
Time dummy (2004) -0.124 ***     -0.056 **     -0.081 ***     
(0.019)      (0.022)      (0.015)      
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German establishment             0.435 *** 0.453 *** 0.422 *** 
            (0.018)  (0.032)  (0.018)  
Constant 0.320 *** 0.293 *** 0.238 *** 0.363 *** 0.443 *** 0.216 *** 0.153 *** 0.154 * 0.059  
(0.049)   (0.075)   (0.056)   (0.074)   (0.120)   (0.057)   (0.048)   (0.084)   0.0398   
No. of  observations 10,686 3,552 7,134 2,991 1,502 1,489 13,677 7,134 8,623 
R2 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.18 0.26 
Sources: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS 1998 and 2004.  
Notes: ‘Manufacturing’ and ‘Size 10-20’ are the reference industry and employment size categories, respectively.  
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TABLE 4a 
Within Versus Compositional Change in Germany and Britain by Type 
of Institution, Weighted Data, 1998 and 2004 
 Germany Britain 
(a) Collective agreement of any type/union recognition 1998 2004 1998 2004 
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 62.5 51.1 20.3 14.5 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004  -11.4  -5.8 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients  63.7  19.0 
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics   1.2 
(-10.9%) 
 -1.3 
(21.8%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior   -12.6 
(110.9%) 
 -4.6 
(78.2%) 
(b) Collective agreement of any type         
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 62.5 51.1 16.9 10.6 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004  -11.4  -6.3 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients  63.7  17.0 
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics  1.2 
(-10.9%) 
 0.1 
(-1.6%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior   -12.6 
(110.9%) 
 -6.4 
(101.6%) 
(c) Sectoral-level agreement         
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 56.9 47.1 4.2 1.8 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004  -9.8  -2.4 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients  58.0  3.5 
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics  1.0 
(-10.5%) 
 -0.7 
(29.7%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior   -10.8 
(110.5%) 
 -1.7 
(70.3%) 
(d) Firm-level agreement         
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 5.6 4.0 8.3 7.7 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004  -1.6  -0.6 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients  5.8  8.3 
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics  0.2 
(-13.3%) 
 0.0 
(0.0%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior   -1.8 
(113.3%) 
 -0.6 
(100.0%) 
(e)Works councils/Joint consultative committees         
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 17.0 17.6 14.5 10.1 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004  0.6  -4.4 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients  19.7  13.3 
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics  2.7 
(452.5%) 
 -1.2 
(26.4%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior    -2.1 
(-352.5%) 
  -3.2 
(73.6%) 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS, 1998 and 2004. 
Notes: For each panel, row (3) is given by [x_04*b_98]; row (4), the between-effect, is given by 
[(x_04 – x_98)*b_98], or row (3) minus row (1) in 1998; row (5), the within-effect, is given by 
[x_04*(b_04 – b_98)], or row (2) minus row (4). x denotes the observed mean characteristics and b 
the estimated coefficients in the corresponding year. See equation (4) in the text. 
 
 29 
 
TABLE 4b 
Within- Versus Compositional Change by Type of Institution and by Year, Weighted 
Data, 1998 and 2004  
 1998 2004 
(a) Collective agreement of any type/union recognition Germany UK Germany UK 
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 62.5 20.3 51.1 14.5 
(2) Percentage point gap (Germany-Britain)  -42.2  -36.6 
(3) Predicted coverage based on German propensities  59.2  46.8 
(4) Percentage point gap due to differences in 
characteristics 
 -3.3 
(7.8%) 
 -4.3 
(11.8%) 
(5) Percentage point gap due to changes in behavior  -38.9 
(92.2%) 
 -32.3 
(88.2%) 
(b) Collective agreement of any type            
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 62.5 16.9 51.1 10.6 
(2) Percentage point gap (Germany-Britain)  -45.6  -40.5 
(3) Predicted coverage based on German propensities  59.2  47.0 
(4) Percentage point gap due to differences in 
characteristics 
 -3.3 
(7.1%) 
 -4.1 
(10.2%) 
(5) Percentage point gap due to changes in behavior  -42.3 
(92.9%) 
 -36.4 
(89.8%) 
(c) Sectoral-level agreement            
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 56.9 4.2 47.1 1.8 
(2) Percentage point gap (Germany-Britain)  -52.8  -45.4 
(3) Predicted coverage based on German propensities  51.0  40.3 
(4) Percentage point gap due to differences in 
characteristics 
 -5.9 
(11.3%) 
 -6.8 
(15.1%) 
(5) Percentage point gap due to changes in behavior  -46.8 
(88.7%) 
 -38.5 
(84.9%) 
(d)Firm -level agreement            
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 5.6 8.3 4.0 7.7 
(2) Percentage point gap (Germany-Britain)  2.8  3.7 
(3) Predicted coverage based on German propensities  8.2  6.7 
(4) Percentage point gap due to differences in 
characteristics 
 2.7 
(96.8%) 
 2.7 
(72.5%) 
(5) Percentage point gap due to changes in behavior  0.1 
(3.2%) 
 1.0 
(27.5%) 
(e)Works councils/Joint consultative committees            
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 17.0 14.5 17.6 10.1 
(2) Percentage point gap (Germany-Britain)  -2.6  -7.5 
(3) Predicted coverage based on German propensities  25.4  26.2 
(4) Percentage point gap due to differences in 
characteristics 
 8.3 
(-325.0%) 
 8.5 
(-113.3%) 
(5) Percentage point gap due to changes in behavior   -10.9 
(425.0%) 
  -16.1 
(213.3%) 
Notes: For each panel, row (3) is given by x_B*b_G, while rows (4) and (5) are given by  
(x_G – x_B)*b_G (the between-effect) and x_B*(b_G –- b_B) (the within-effect), respectively; B 
and G denote Britain and Germany; x denotes the observed mean characteristics; and b gives the 
estimated coefficients in the corresponding year. See equation (5) in the text. 
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TABLE 5 
Counterfactual Coverage Rates in Germany and Britain 
 
 German propensities with 
British characteristics 
British propensities with 
German characteristics  
1998 2004 1998 2004 
(a)Collective agreement of any type/union recognition      
(1) Counterfactual coverage rate (%) 59.2 46.9 9.9 2.6 
(2) Percentage point decline (2004-1998)  -12.3  -7.3 
     
(b) Collective agreement of any type           
(1) Counterfactual coverage rate (%) 59.2 46.9 7.6 3.0 
(2) Percentage point decline (2004-1998)  -12.3  -4.6 
     
(c) Sectoral-level agreement         
(1) Counterfactual coverage rate (%) 51.0 40.3 1.5 0.7 
(2) Percentage point decline (2004-1998)  -10.7  -0.8 
     
(d) Firm-level agreement         
(1) Counterfactual coverage rate (%) 8.2 6.7 1.6 1.8 
(2) Percentage point decline (2004-1998)  -1.6  0.2 
     
(e) Works councils/Joint consultative committees         
(1) Counterfactual coverage rate (%) 25.4 26.2 14.4 7.5 
(2) Percentage point decline (2004-1998)  0.8  -6.9 
Notes: In each panel, the counterfactual coverage rate in the first and second columns is given by 
x_B*b_G and x_G*b_B, respectively; B and G denote Britain and Germany; x denotes the observed 
mean characteristics; and b gives the estimated coefficients in the corresponding year. 
 
 
 0 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX TABLE 1 
Within Versus Compositional Change in Germany and Britain, Weighted Data, 1998 and 2004, Full Specification  
 
 Collective agreement of 
any type /union 
recognition 
Sectoral agreement Firm-level agreement Works councils/JCCs 
 Germany 1998 2004   1998 2004   1998 2004   1998 2004   
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 62.5 51.8  56.9 47.8  5.6 4.0  17.0 17.7  
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004  -10.7   -9.1   -1.6   0.7  
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients  65.0   59.5   5.5   19.5  
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in 
characteristics 
 2.5 (-23.6%)  2.6 (-28.6%)  -0.1 (4.4%)  2.4 (369.7%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior    -13.3 (123.6%)   -11.8 (128.6%)   -1.5 (95.6%)   -1.8 (-269.7%) 
Britain             
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 19.7 14.6  4.2 1.8  8.2 7.7  14.7 10.1  
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004  -5.1   -2.4   -0.5   -4.8  
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients  17.6   3.2   8.4   14.3  
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in 
characteristics 
 -2.2 (41.9%)  -1.0 (39.3%)  0.2 (-34.7%)  -0.4 (9.6%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior   -2.98 (58.1%)  -1.5 (60.7%)  -0.7 (134.7%)  -4.3 (90.4%) 
Sources: IAB Establishment Panel; WERS, 1998 and 2004. 
Notes: See notes to Table 4a. The model includes an extended set of industry and regional dummies for Germany and in the case of Britain 
detailed regional and workforce composition dummies.  
 
  
APPENDIX TABLE 2 
Within- Versus Compositional Change in Germany and Britain by Type of 
Institution, Unweighted Data, 1998-2004 
 
 Germany Britain 
(a) Collective agreement of any type/union recognition   1998 2004 1998 2004 
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 69.3 57.7 39.1 33.6 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004  -11.6  -5.5 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients  70.3  37.9 
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics  1.0 
(-8.6%) 
 -1.2 
(21.8%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior   -12.6 
(108.6%) 
 -4.3 
(78.2%) 
(b) Collective agreement of any type       
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 69.3 57.7 35.0 28.0 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004  -11.6  -7.0 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients  70.3  33.9 
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 
 
1.0 
(-8.6%)  
-1.1 
(15.7%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior  
 
-12.6 
(108.6%)  
-5.9 
(84.3%) 
(c) Sectoral-level agreement     
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 58.3 48.8 5.4 4.9 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004  -9.5  -0.5 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients  61.5  4.8 
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 
 
3.2 
(-33.7%)  
-0.6 
(120.0%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior  
 
-12.7 
(133.7%)  
0.1 
(-20.0%) 
(d) Firm-level agreement     
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 11.0 9.0 26.3 22.1 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004 -2.0  -4.2 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients 8.8  25.4 
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics -2.2 
(110.0%)  
-0.9 
(21.4%) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior  0,2 
(-10.0%)  
-3.3 
(78.6%) 
(e) Works-council/Joint consultative committee     
(1) Observed coverage rate (%) 48.2 43.6 34.3 31.1 
(2) Percentage point change, 1998-2004 -4.6  -3.2 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 1998 coefficients 48.9  31.8 
(4) Percentage point change due to changes in characteristics 0.7 
(-15.2)  
-2.5 
(78.1) 
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in behavior  -5.3 
(115.2)  
-0.7 
(21.9) 
Notes: See notes to Table 4a. 
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